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Summary. -Conventional wisdom holds that LDC debt problems reflect, in part, the switch of 
foreign financing towards commercial loans. With no adequate supervision over the use of these 
funds, international finance may not have improved the capacity to repay external debt. This 
paper tests two aspects of this proposition. First, have commercial loans been directed more to- 
wards consumption and less to investment than official loans? We find no evidence to suggest this 
has been true. Second. does an increase in the marginal propensity to invest out of foreign loans 
improve creditworthiness? Again, we find no supporting evidence. We do find, however, that 
raising the marginal rate of domestic saving out of income does improve creditworthiness. This 
provides justification for policy conditionality associated with foreign borrowing that goes 
beyond concern with the uses of individual loans. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom holds that less devel- 
oped country (LDC) debt rescheduling problems 
reflect, in part, the failure of borrowers to invest 
their loans in productive activities with returns, 
evaluated at border prices, higher than the 
interest rate on their debt. This worry became 
particularly acute because of the rapid switch of 
external financing in the 1970s away from official 
sources, mostly tied to closely supervised invest- 
ment projects, towards commercial loans without 
such ties. Between 1975-78, one half of all euro- 
credits were destined for “banking and finance” 
and “general purpose,” rather than for real fixed 
capital formation. The perceived danger was that 
such loans could be used to finance consumption 
and, by analogy with a firm that fails to invest 
borrowed funds, would lead to long-term insol- 
vency. Indeed, most non-oil developing countries 
had lower average savings rates after 1973.’ 
Several policy statements sounded a warning that 
“international finance must serve to increase pro- 
ductive investment in debtor countries and to im- 
prove their capacity to repay their external 
debt.“’ 
The aim of this paper 1s to assess the empirical 
significance of these hypotheses. First, we ask 
whether high foreign borrowing has been associ- 
ated with the fall in average savings rates. Next, 
we ask whether there has been any discernible 
difference in the marginal propensity to consume 
out of project and non-project foreign financing. 
Although we lack details on the classification of 
loans, we can safely assume that the period of the 
1960s and early 1970s was characterized by a sub- 
stantially larger proportion of project leading 
than the period of the mid- to late-1970s. The 
analysis of the relationship between savings and 
foreign exchange inflows follows the tradition of 
a substantial literature, e.g., Weisskopf (1972); 
Griffin (1970); Papanek (1972). A novel feature 
here is the explicit focus on structural change 
over time. 
Second, we address the question of whether 
the structural coefficients of the consumption 
function have been important determinants of 
creditworthiness. That is, we attempt to establish 
the empirical significance of the hypothesis that 
more thrifty countries - those that invest more 
on the margin, both out of income and out of 
foreign resource inflows - are more credit- 
worthy. Although such arguments have been 
asserted for many years, the empirical literature 
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on the determinants of creditworthiness has com- 
pletely ignored differences across countries and 
across ttme periods of important macroeconomic 
structural coefficients.3 As Kharas (1984) has 
argued before, there are sound theoretical 
reasons for inclusion of such coefficients. An em- 
pirical confirmation is also important because a 
substantial component of the policy conditional- 
ity associated with reschedulings is geared to the 
improvement of domestic savings rates and not 
to improvement in the traditional indicators of 
creditworthiness such as higher GDP or export 
growth.’ 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, we derive efficient estima- 
tors for the structural coefficients of interest. 
This involves estimating consumption functions 
for each of the 26 developing countries in our 
sample. The marginal propensities to consume 
out of both income and foreign borrowing are 
then included as independent variables in a 
probit analysis of the determinants of reschedul- 
ings in Section 3. Our findings indicate that 
marginal savings rates out of income are signifi- 
cant and have played a quantitatively important 
role in differentiating between country credit- 
worthiness. A higher marginal propensity to 
invest out of foreign resource inflows seems to 
have played a minor quantitative and statistically 
insignificant role in determining creditworthi- 
ness. The policy implications of our analysis are 
expanded upon in the concluding Section 4. Our 
results provide cross-country empirical support 
for certain types of policy conditionality in pack- 
ages designed to restore creditworthiness. 
2. CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS 
The relationship between domestic savings and 
foreign resource inflows has generated consider- 
able controversy. The empirical magnitude of the 
relationship and the policy implications that fol- 
low from a negative correlation between dom- 
estic savings and resource inflows from abroad 
are often disputed.5 For example, Griffin (1970) 
takes this as prima facie evidence that aid retards 
development. Others maintain that this is not a 
proper test of the effectiveness of aid. Even if 
there is a less than one-for-one increase in in- 
vestment with an increase in foreign inflows, wel- 
fare would still be raised provided the real return 
on capital exceeded the real cost of borrowing. If 
there is a link between domestic savings rates and 
creditworthiness, however, there may be a need 
to reassess the impact of foreign inflow and to 
analyze whether different modalities of foreign 
financing have different macroeconomic effects. 
The first stage of the analysis is to establish the 
impact of foreign inflows on domestic consump- 
tion and to test whether the marginal propensity 
to consume out of project-related foreign capital 
inflows is different from that out of non-project 
inflows. To do this, we estimate aggregate con- 
sumption functions for each of the 26 countries in 
our sample. Our procedure differs from the ex- 
isting literature in two ways. First, we use only 
time-series, not cross-sectional, analysis. We 
avoid the bias that may arise due to the simul- 
taneous determination of consumption and in- 
come by using instrumental variables. Second. 
we look for possible differences in the effects of 
alternative types of foreign financing, by testing 
for the structural stability of the relationship over 
time. 
(a) The model 
Consider the following simple model: 
PC=a,]+a,(Y- 7) (1) 
BC=b,,+b,T+b,FI (2) 
T = t,, + t, Y - t2 Fi (3) 
TC=PC+BC (4) 
where PC, BC, TC are private, public and total 
consumption, respectively; Y is a measure of in- 
come, T is government net revenue and FI is 
foreign inflows. 
Private consumption is based upon disposable 
income. Government consumption is a function 
of net revenues and net foreign capital inflows 
into the country. Total net foreign capital 
inflow8 rather than public inflows alone are con- 
sidered because this reflects total government 
borrowing from domestic and foreign sources. 
Government domestic borrowing in many in- 
stances forces the private sector to borrow 
offshore, or else is ultimately financed by a loss 
of foreign reserves. In both cases, net foreign 
inflows to the country increase even if official 
external borrowing does not. Government net 
revenue is also a function of income and net for- 
eign inflows. The latter reflects the notion that 
public borrowing is often used to finance trans- 
fers to the private sector. Some governments may 
have weakened their tax collection as borrowing 
opportunities arose. In addition, borrowing 
has permitted a delay in adjustment to large rela- 
tive price changes, reflected in growing public 
enterprise operating deficits and other forms of 
subsidies. 
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Combining equations (l)-(4), we can derive a 
structural equation for total consumption: 
TC = c,, + c, Y + c2 FI + u (3 
Equation (5) should not be estimated by ordinary 
least squares due to the simultaneous equation 
bias arising from the national accounts identity, 
Y = TC + I + Ff. Accordingly, we use lagged 
values of TC, I, and FZ along with the contem- 
poraneous value of Ff as instruments for Y. In 
this instance, then, two-stage least squares and 
instrumental variables estimation are identical. 
We give careful attention to deriving the correct 
standard errors of estimated parameters - a 
potential problem when the instrumental vari- 
ables method is done in two steps. 
In estimating equation (5), we treat foreign in- 
flows as an exogenous variable. This is justified 
for two reasons. First, for many countries, for- 
eign inflows are supply-determined. That is, 
credit rationing is likely to be pervasive. In the 
1960s this assumption seemed reasonable. Most 
foreign lending was by official creditors, or took 
the form of supplier credits or private direct in- 
vestment. None of these would be responsive to 
short-term unanticipated changes in demand. 
Empirical results in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) 
confirm this. During the mid-1970s, however, 
with the growth of syndicated lending, the exist- 
ence of credit rationing was less pervasive. While 
some countries were still undoubtedly rationed 
(see Kharas and Shishido, 1984). others were 
not. Even for this latter group, however, we 
would argue that total foreign inflows can be 
properly treated as exogenous, even though the 
composition of capital flows, between long-term 
debt, short-term debt and reserve changes, may 
be endogenous. This follows in a long tradition of 
open-economy reduced-form equations (e.g., 
Kouri and Porter, 1974) in which the current 
account deficit is treated as an exogenous deter- 
minant of the components of capital inflows. 
(b) Data and results 
With these caveats, equation (5) was estimated 
using instrumental variables for 26 developing 
countries for the period 1961-81. The data were 
drawn from the World Bank’s World Tables. 
They consist simply of the national income 
account series for each country. Foreign inflows 
are derived from national income data on exports 
and imports of goods and non-factor services, 
and on net factor income from abroad (FI= M - 
X - NFI). All variables were expressed in per 
capita terms and deflated to limit heterosked- 
asticity. The consumption variable includes 
both private and public consumption. Measured 
income is defined as the sum of gross domestic 
output at current market prices plus net factor 
income from abroad. A Cochrane-Orcutt pro- 
cedure was used to correct for serial correlation, 
whenever detected. 
We then proceeded to test for any differences 
in the estimated marginal propensities to con- 
sume out of project (PI) and non-project (NPI) 
foreign inflows. No direct test was feasible, be- 
cause these are not independently observed vari- 
ables; only the sum is observable from national 
accounts data. Details on the sources of foreign 
inflows, between private and official creditors, 
for example, are available, but there is no sys- 
tematic macroeconomic information on the pur- 
pose of loans. Official loans, although primarily 
for projects, have recently been increasingly 
used for non-project purposes such as export 
promotion, budgetary support or balance of 
payments financing. Conversely, many private 
inflows have financed investment. Thus, the 
official/private distinction is not a good proxy 
for project/non-project comparisons. We can, 
however, make the assumption that non-project 
lending has increased substantially relative to 
project lending during the 1970s as compared 
with the 1960s. This reflects both the growth of 
commercial eurocredits as a source of finance 
and the increasing attention given by official 
creditors to non-project financing. Given this 
assumption, we would expect differences be- 
tween the marginal propensities to consume 
out of these types of foreign inflows to be re- 
flected in a structural change over time in the 
estimated coefficient on aggregate foreign in- 
flows. On the other hand, if foreign funds are 
fully fungible. then no such differences would be 
observed. 
To see this formally, consider the following 
simple model where variables other than foreign 
inflows have been excluded for expositional 
purposes. 
TC, = f, PI, + fz NPI, + v, (6) 
Fl(= PI, + NPI, (7) 
We are interested in whether or not ft = fr. We 
only observe FI, however, not PI or NPI. Con- 
sider the estimator, f, of the least squares coeffi- 
cient obtained from a regression of consumption 
on total foreign inflows (equation (8)). 
7-C, = f FI, + w, (8) 
782 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 





V(F0 V( FI) 
where C(FZ, Pf), C(FI, NPI) are the covariance 
of foreign inflows with its project and non- 
project components, respectively, and V(Ff) is 
the variance of foreign inflows. Equation (9) 
shows that the estimated coefficient f is simply a 
weighted average of the two underlying coeffi- 
cients f, and fi. Note that if PI and NPI are inde- 
pendent, which does not seem too unreasonable, 
then the weights are simply the share that each 
variable contributes to the total variance of 
both.’ It is now easy to see that the assumption 
that non-project inflows were substantially more 
important during the 1970s (and therefore have a 
large covariance with FI) implies that the weight 
of fi should be higher in this period. Thus, E(J) 
for 1960-70 should be significantly different from 
E(f) for 1970-80 if fi is different from fi. If, on 
the other hand, f, = fi, then the change in the 
weights has no impact on f (indeed, using the sum 
of total foreign inflows, FZ, is appropriate). We 
can, therefore, make inferences based on the de- 
tection of changes over time in f. In fact, .!?@) 
70-80 5 ECf) 60-70 implies fi > fi. (Of 
course, another possibility is that the true par- 
ameters, f, and fi, are themselves changing 
over time in an unknown way. Then we cannot 
make any inferences about them.) 
Structural change at alternative dates was 
examined using a Chow test. When a Chow test 
indicated a structural shift, the consumption 
function for that country was run using slope 
dummies for both the foreign inflows and the in- 
come variables.’ The dummies take a value of 
one after a certain date and zero before that date. 
Hence, we ran the following regression: 
C, = a0 + a, y; + az d. u; + us Fr, + 
a4 d. FI, + u, (10) 
The time at which we posit a shift was varied 
according to judgments based on knowledge of 
country experience. Where there was serial cor- 
relation, each sub-sample was transformed using 
the rho estimated for the whole sample.’ 
The results of the estimated consumption func- 
tions are shown in Table 1. The coefficients 
mostly have the right sign and are significant. In 
12 countries, consumption is significantly raised 
by foreign inflows. The regressions are fairly 
stable over time. One-half of the sample, 13 
countries, showed evidence of structural change. 
Of these, only one country (Colombia) showed a 
significant decline in the marginal propensity to 
consume out of foreign inflows during the later 
period covering the 197Os, while three (Brazil, 
Central African Republic and Tunisia) countries 
showed a significant increase. We conclude, 
therefore, that for most developing countries 
there is no strong evidence that the expansion of 
non-project lending in the 1970s led to a structu- 
ral change in the propensity to consume out of 
foreign inflows. There is, however, a strong as- 
sociation between higher borrowing and higher 
consumption throughout the period for most 
countries. It seems, therefore, that the fall in 
average savings rates that was observed during 
the 1970s can be largely explained as a reflection 
of the expanding volume of foreign inflows rather 
than of the changing composition of such flows. 
The marginal savings rates do not seem to 
change. 
3. CREDITWORTHINESS ANALYSIS 
Following the analysis in Kharas (1984), we 
assume that creditworthiness problems arise 
when random shocks lead to a reduction of actual 
GNP below some critical level. The critical level 
of GNP, Q, is the level that would avoid long- 
run collapse in consumption and output if debt 
service were paid, given a stable relationship be- 
tween consumption, income and net foreign 
inflows.” 
@ = go = gl FI -I- g2D (11) 
where D is debt outstanding. 
The higher the level of net foreign inflows, and 
the lower the stock of debt, the lower is the criti- 
cal output level. This follows from the fact that 
high net borrowing and low debt permit higher 
consumption and investment after debt service 
obligations have been met. 
Creditworthiness problems are not actually 
observed. We do, however, observe reschedul- 
ings. Define a dependent variable, y’, that when 
y* > 0, a rescheduling occurs and when y* < 0, it 
does not. We can relate y* to the ratio of critical 
to actual output. 
where C is a constant. Assuming c to be nor- 
mally distributed, (11) and (12) can be combined 
to get the probability of y* > 0 conditional on Q, 
FI, and D. 
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0.862’ 0.634 -0.048’ 
(13.0) (1.35) (-3.08) 
0.742’ 0.882’ 0.023 
(7.77) (3.13) (0.988) 
0.521’ 0.233 - 
(11.8) (1.73) - 
0.88’ -1.99 -0.087 
(7.43) (-1.71) (-1.36) 
0.831’ 0.0609 -p.O65* 
(3.10) (0.557) (2.47) 
0.889’ 0.989’ 0.004 
(14.5) (3.00) (0.207) 
0.615’ 0.623’ - 
(28.4) (5.91) - 
1.29’ 0.760 - 
(4.30) (1.39) - 
1.19’ 1.16 - 
(3.09) (2.35) - 
0.758’ 0.091 - 
(64.8) (0.72) - 
0.587’ 0.295 0.0027 
(5.12) (0.59) (0.04) 
0.63’ 0.158 - 
(66.4) (1.44) - 
0.476’ 0.193 - 
(9.98) (0.974) - 
0.788’ 0.034 - 
(39.5) (0.027) - 
0.602’ 0.334 -0.134’ 
(0.855) (1.93) (-2.14) 
0.683’ 0.572’ - 
(14.7) (5.77) - 
0.829’ 0.489 -0.009 
(7.82) (0.757) (-0.18) 
0.518’ 0.763’ - 
(17.0) (6.15) - 
1.07’ 0.873 0.063’ 
(2.78) (1.22) (2.58) 
1.23’ 1.36’ - 
(4.46) (3.83) - 
1.018’ 1.19’ -0.068’ 
(9.87) (4.53) (-2.78) 
0.717’ 0.064 - 
(37.5) (0.42) - 
1.03’ 0.363’ - 
(5.47) (2.95) - 
0.711’ -0.166 -0.057’ 
(6.27) (-0.31) (-2.25) 
1.16’ 0.241 -0.016 
(6.35) (0.686) (-0.541) 
0.518’ 0.354 -0.059 







































































































Note: consumption is the dependent variable; r-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
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Y * = -C + go . (l/Q) - gt . (Fl/Q) + 
gz. (D/Q, + r; (13) 
Equation (13) is estimated in three ways. First, 
we assume that C, go, g, and g? are constant 
across countries and over time (Run 1). Next, we 
assume that there are country and time-specific 
effects in C, which are captured by the coeffi- 
cients of the consumption functions estimated 
above. Thus we replace C by CL + cl) + mpcy + 
mpcfi where ce, mpcy and mpcfi are the con- 
sumption function constant term and long-run 
marginal propensities to consume out of in- 
come and foreign inflows, respectively (Run 2). 
Finally, we assume that the above parameters 
enter in a non-linear way (Run 3): go is replaced 
by: 
and gr -is replaced by 
gl [(I - c2Y(l - CJI. 
These transformations are derived in the Ap- 
pendix. 
(a) Data artd results 
Data on reschedulings were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Debt Tables, 1984. The de- 
pendent variable was assigned a value of one if a 
rescheduling occurred and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables, GDP and FI, are those 
already used in the consumption function regres- 
sions. Debt outstanding was taken from the 
World Debt Tables. The variables CO and mpcy 
and mpcfi are derived from the regressions 
above. 
Equation (13) was estimated with each 
country-year pair treated as a separate observa- 
tion. The sample is as shown in Table 1. Thus, 
there were 251 total observations, of which J1 
had reschedulings. Due to the binary nature of 
the dependent variable, we used a probit pro- 
cedure. The coefficients are given in Table 2. 
In the bench-mark Run 1, all the variables 
have the correct sign, but the coefficients on per 
capita output and net foreign inflows are insigni- 
ficant. There appears to be no evidence that the 
richer developing countries are significantly more 
creditworthy. Nor does it appear that higher 
foreign borrowings lower the chance of resched- 
uling. High debt/output ratios emerge as the 
most significant determinants of reschedulings. 
This contrasts with earlier findings that all three 
variables are significant (Kharas, 1984). The dif- 
ference is mostly attributable to the updating of 
the sample. In the period considered here, most 
of the rescheduling observations are on rich Latin 
American countries. Of particular interest here, 
however, is the significance of the coefficients on 
the consumption function introduced in Run 2. 
The coefficient on the marginal propensity to 
consume out of income has the correct sign and is 
significant. Countries that consume more on the 
margin are less creditworthy. The marginal pro- 
pensity to consume out of foreign inflows, 
however, is insignificant. In addition, the absol- 
ute value of the coefficient is very small. There 
does not appear to be any support for the hypoth- 
esis that failure to use foreign inflows for invest- 
ment purposes has been a factor in triggering 
debt crises.r’ 
Run 3 results corroborate these findings. In 
this run, the independent variables, output and 
net foreign inflows, are transformed into new 
variables using the estimated structural coeffi- 
cients of the consumption functions. Although 
the first variable remains insignificant (the nega- 
tive sign is due to the influence of co, the constant 
term from the consumption function), the coeffi- 
Table 2. Determinants of rescheduling* 
Rlln 
f-08 
c l/Q FIIQ D/Q CO mpcy mpcfi likelihood 
1 -1.52 3.86 -1.59 0.382 - - - - 145.7 
(-12.8) (0.367) (-1.48) (3.07) - - - 
2 2.49 7.41 -1.98 0.497 -0.118 1.03 0.018 - 133.71 
(-6.83) (0.297) (-1.70) (3.47) (-2.61) (2.33) (-0.074) 
3 1.52 -0.032t -0.48 0.239 - - - - 145.6 
(13.94) (-0.12) (-2.17) (2.16) - - - 
‘t-statistics in parentheses. 
tcoefficient on transformed variable. 
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cient on new foreign inflows, in combination with 
the income and inflows consumption propen- 
sities, becomes significant. These results suggest 
that concern with countries’ savings rates out of 
income is indeed appropriate for lenders. Policy 
changes that improve domestic saving rates can 
be as important as organizing additional in- 
flows, or improving GDP growth, in re-estab- 
lishing creditworthiness. However, the use to 
which foreign funds are put, whether consumed 
or invested, does not appear to be important. 
4. CONCLUSION 
It has been argued that foreign inflows jeopar- 
dize creditworthiness both through the build-up 
of debt and through their negative impact on 
domestic saving. Some have suggested that the 
latter effect was reinforced in the 1970s due to 
the shift towards untied commercial sources of 
external funds. We have undertaken an empirical 
analysis of these hypotheses, covering 26 de- 
veloping countries from 1961 to 1982. We find in 
almost all cases that foreign borrowing does re- 
duce average domestic saving rates. However, 
we find no evidence to suggest that shifts in 
sources and patterns of foreign financing have 
altered country behavior. It appears that from a 
macroeconomic view, foreign funds have been 
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sufficiently fungible with domestic resources such 
that their impact on domestic investment and 
consumption has remained unchanged, regard- 
less of whether the loans were tied to specific 
projects or not. 
Also, we find strong empirical support for the 
proposition that raising marginal rates of saving 
out of income is significant in improving credit- 
worthiness. The marginal propensity to consume 
out of foreign inflows, however, is not signifi- 
cant. Additional foreign lending, in and of itself, 
can improve creditworthiness in the short run, 
but worsens it in the long run as debt builds up. 
Only if foreign borrowing can help to achieve 
structural reform, through raising marginal sav- 
ing rates, is its impact on creditworthiness sub- 
stantial. This may occur even if average saving 
rates decline as a result of the foreign inflows. 
These findings support the usefulness of the kind 
of policy conditionality that has accompanied 
recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
International Bank for Reconstruction and,De- 
velopment (IBRD) program loans to coun- 
tries with debt servicing difficulties. For example, 
financial liberalization, control of inflation and 
maintenance of positive real interest rates, and 
reductions in the primary deficit of the public sec- 
tor should all serve to raise long-run marginal 
saving rates. 
NOTES 
1. Middle-income oil-importing developing coun- 
tries on average had savings rates of 21.5% in 1973 and 
18.0% in 1981. 
2. Excerpt of speech by J. de Larosiere, Managing 
Director, IMF, delivered before the Economic and 
Social Council of the UN, Geneva, 3 July 1981. 
3. For a review of the assertions and empirical evi- 
dence, see McDonald (1982). 
4. For the most part, policy conditions have resulted 
in sharply lower investment and growth. The desired 
improvement in the trade balance has primarily been 
achieved through reduction in imports. 
7. When the other independent variables are in- 
cluded in the model, the basic result that f is a 
weighted average still holds but the weights are less 
easily interpreted in an intuitive fashion. 
8. There is some pre-test bias with this approach. 
We are not, however, interested in estimating in an un- 
biased way precisely when the structural change OC- 
curred. but only if the coefficients are different 
between any two sub-samples. The bias, therefore, is in 
favor of detecting structural change. 
9. See Corsi. Pollock and Prakken (1982). 
5. See, for example, Griffin (1970). Weisskopf 
(1982), Papanek (1972) and Heller (1975). 
10. See Appendix for a derivation of @. 
6. Total net foreign capital inflows are defined here 11. The figures in Table 2 should be treated with cau- 
as the sum of gross foreign capital inflows through bor- tion but not skepticism. The inclusion of estimated 
rowing, direct investment, or other capital flows, to coefficients as independent variables gives rise to 
both the public and private sectors, less total repay- biased estimates. The quantitative impact of this bias, 
ment of principal to foreigners. Given the accounting though. is likely to be very small given the high r- 
identities in the balance of payments, total foreign capi- statistics on the estimated coefficients. This is a subject 
tal inflows is identical to the current account balance. of further research by Levinsohn. 
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APPENDIX 
Consider an economy where technology is Leontief. 
fixed-coefficients and labor is in surplus in the relevant 
range. The change in income is determined by the 
output/capital ratio, b, the previous year’s level of in- 
vestment and the change in interest payments on exter- 
nal debt. 
i=bk-rb (1) 
Investment, k. is given by the sum of domestic saving 
and foreign inflows. 
k=Y-TC+Lj (2) 
=-c,,+(l-c,)Y+(I-c2)D (24 
Foreign inflows are exogenously given by lenders. 
Assume gross inflows are exogenous and that amortiz- 
ation is a constant fraction of debt outstanding: 
D=FI-BD (3) 
Rewriting 
M=r 0 b(l-c,) -r-b0(1-cz) Y + 
[ Wfcz’] F,_ [“o’“] -’ 
I[ 1 
D (4) 
The general solution to the equation above is charac- 
terized by the two eiv pairs: 
A, = b(1 - c,). v, = ; ; [ I 
A2 = -8, v1 ZZ 
[ 
r + bB(l-cz) 
41-c,) + e 1 
because the roots are real and of opposite signs, the 
solution is characterized by a saddle-point equilibrium. 
All points above the eigenvector v, lead to ever- 
decreasing debt/income ratios. A critical income level 
can be defined, for each initial debt stock, such that 
above this level, domestic savings are sufficient to gen- 
erate a growth path with falling debt-income in the 
long run. 
r + bB(l-ca) 
y = b(i - C) e 
. D - A.FI +& (5) 
I 
where A is a constant that depends on (1 - c,) and 
(1 - cz). 
